Spinoza on Human and Divine Knowledge

In Yitzhak Y. Melamed, A Companion to Spinoza. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 251–264 (2021)
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Abstract

This chapter argues that the human perspective is not fully reducible – that is, that something would indeed be lost in the absence of the human perspective. It shows that epistemic subjectivity itself is an irreducible, ineliminable feature of the human standpoint. Subjectivity goes along with substantiality, and to be an epistemic subject is to be a substance with a mind. In E2p13, Spinoza identifies the mind's object with the body, thereby specifying where the multiplicity of epistemic subjects comes from – how, that is, individual epistemic subjects are identified and differentiated. The chapter looks at how the three kinds of knowledge relate to the notions of epistemic subjectivity. These include: imaginative knowledge; reason, or knowledge from common notions; and intuitive knowledge. Imaginative knowledge works straightforwardly on the model of having ideas in the thick sense.

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Author Profiles

Barnaby R. Hutchins
University of Ghent
Ursula Renz
University of Graz

Citations of this work

Spinoza's Really Confused Ideas.Ruben Noorloos - 2024 - Journal of Spinoza Studies 3 (2):49-65.
Mind-Body Parallelism and Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind.Ruben Noorloos - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European University

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