Buddhist Hard Determinism: No Self, No Free Will, No Responsibility

Journal of Buddhist Ethics 19:130-197 (2012)
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Abstract

A critical review of Charles Goodman's view about Buddhism and free will to the effect that Buddhism is hard determinist, basically because he thinks Buddhist causation is definitively deterministic, and he thinks determinism is definitively incompatible with free will, but especially because he thinks Buddhism is equally definitively clear on the non-existence of a self, from which he concludes there cannot be an autonomous self.

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Rick Repetti
Kingsborough Community College (CUNY)

References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Meaning and reference.Hilary Putnam - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):699-711.
Meaning and Reference.Hilary Putnam - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 299-308.
What kind of free will did the Buddha teach?Asaf Federman - 2010 - Philosophy East and West 60 (1):pp. 1-19.

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