Constructive logic, truth and warranted assertability

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):474-483 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Shapiro and Taschek have argued that simply using intuitionistic logic and its Heyting semantics, one can show that there are no gaps in warranted assertability. That is, given that a discourse is faithfully modeled using Heyting's semantics for the logical constants, then if a statement _S is not warrantedly assertable, its negation (superscript box) _S is. Tennant has argued for this conclusion on similar grounds. I show that these arguments fail, albeit in illuminating ways. An appeal to constructive logic does not commit one to this strong epistemological thesis, but appeals to semantics of intuitionistic logic none the less do give us certain conclusions about the connections between warranted assertability and truth. (edited)

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Constructive Sheaf Semantics.Erik Palmgren - 1997 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 43 (3):321-327.
Negationless intuitionism.Enrico Martino - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (2):165-177.
On adopting Kripke semantics in set theory.Luca Incurvati - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):81-96.
Truth-Maker Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic.Kit Fine - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):549-577.
Investigations into intuitionistic and other negations.Satoru Niki - 2022 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 28 (4):532-532.
Dualising Intuitionictic Negation.Graham Priest - 2009 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (2):165-184.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
132 (#166,088)

6 months
11 (#327,430)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

Pluralism and Proofs.Greg Restall - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):279-291.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Elements of Intuitionism.Michael Dummett - 1977 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Roberto Minio.
Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.

View all 7 references / Add more references