Fixed-Point Models for Theories of Properties and Classes

Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1) (2017)
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Abstract

There is a vibrant community among philosophical logicians seeking to resolve the paradoxes of classes, properties and truth by way of adopting some non-classical logic in which trivialising paradoxical arguments are not valid. There is also a long tradition in theoretical computer science|going back to Dana Scott's fixed point model construction for the untyped lambda-calculus of models allowing for fixed points. In this paper, I will bring these traditions closer together, to show how these model constructions can shed light on what we could hope for in a non-trivial model of a theory for classes, properties or truth featuring fixed points.

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Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The iterative conception of set.George Boolos - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (8):215-231.
The non-triviality of dialectical set theory.Ross T. Brady - 1989 - In Graham Priest, Richard Routley & Jean Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag. pp. 437--470.
The inconsistency of certain formal logic.Haskell B. Curry - 1942 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):115-117.
On representing ‘true-in-L’ in L.Robert L. Martin - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):213-217.

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