Structuralism and the Independence of Mathematics

The Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):39-51 (2004)
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Abstract

Mathematical objects, if they exist at all, exist independently of our proofs, constructions and stipulations. For example, whether inaccessible cardinals exist or not, the very act of our proving or postulating that they do doesn’t make it so. This independence thesis is a central claim of mathematical realism. It is also one that many anti-realists acknowledge too. For they agree that we cannot create mathematical truths or objects, though, to be sure, they deny that mathematical objects exist at all. I have defended a mathematical realism of sorts. I interpret the objects of mathematics as positions in patterns, and maintain that they exist independently of us, and our stipulations, proofs, and the like.

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Michael Resnik
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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The Conceivability of Platonism.Benjamin Callard - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):347-356.

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