Abstract

One of the central claims in Ansgar Beckermann’s Gehirn, Ich, Freiheit is that we are biological beings. Somewhat strikingly, the book manages to convey the impression that this is a rather uncontroversial claim. Actually, the opposite is closer to the truth – or so I will try to argue. That it is a controversial claim can be shown by pointing out some of its problematic and seemingly implausible consequences. These consequences come into view by attempting to answer the questions, what biological beings exactly are, and which conditions of diachronic identity they have. Highlighting these problems, I do not try to argue against the claim that we are biological beings, though. In the first place, it shall simply gain profile. Secondly, some options for solving these problems are discussed. In this way, the paper contributes to a defense of the claim that we are biological beings. For although this claim raises serious theoretical problems, it is most likely true.