Desire

Philosophy 60 (234):429 - 445 (1985)
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Abstract

DESIRES ARE INVOLUNTARY MENTAL READINESSES TO DO ACTIONS INDEPENDENTLY OF BELIEFS ABOUT THEIR WORTH. AGENTS OFTEN HAVE A CHOICE WHETHER TO DO THE ACTION BELIEVED BEST OR TO YIELD TO DESIRE TO DO AN ACTION BELIEVED LESS GOOD. ENJOYMENT CONSISTS IN THE SATISFACTION OF DESIRE. ALTHOUGH DESIRES ARE AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT INVOLUNTARY, AN AGENT CAN TAKE STEPS TO CHANGE HIS FUTURE DESIRES.

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References found in this work

Reason and Value.E. J. Bond - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):411-413.
Enjoyment.Richard Warner - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):507-526.

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