Abstract

This article replies to Max Minden Ribeiro’s critique of the view of consciousness I attribute to Nietzsche in my 2021 monograph, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, and to João Constâncio’s comments on that critique, in which he agrees with several of Minden Ribeiro’s conclusions and raises his own questions about my reading of Nietzsche on the social character of reflective consciousness. First, this article argues that Minden Ribeiro’s same-order self-representational reading lacks textual support. Hence, Nietzsche is more plausibly read as a higher-order theorist. At the same time, this article defends my own hybrid higher-order reading by arguing that Nietzsche is committed—as Constâncio used to agree—not only to reflective consciousness but also to phenomenal consciousness. Second, by clarifying in which sense Nietzsche takes reflective consciousness to be social, this article responds to Constâncio’s complaint that my book neglects Nietzsche’s insights about the constitutive sociality of human mindedness.