The Epistemic Agent in Logical Positivism

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79:73-105 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

[ Alan W. Richardson] This essay explores the uses that Michael Friedman and Bas van Fraassen have recently made of the work of Hans Reichenbach. It uses Friedman's work to complicate van Fraassen's invocation of Reichenbach's voluntarism in support of empiricism. It uses van Fraassen's work to motivate a concern with Friedman's neo-Kantian reading of Reichenbach. We are, finally, left with questions about the status and content of the account of the epistemic subject available to an epistemological voluntarist. /// [Thomas E. Uebel] This response considers the question whether empiricists are condemned to silence about the epistemic agency their theories attribute or presuppose. It is argued that, unlike Reichenbach or Carnap, Neurath allowed for and indeed provided specifications of the role of epistemic agency in scientific inquiry. If this is correct, it underscores once more the need to distinguish between the various strands of logical positivism which show different strengths and weaknesses

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,497

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
56 (#378,239)

6 months
4 (#1,233,928)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Thomas Uebel
University of Manchester
Alan Richardson
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references