Abstract

In the eyes of the philosophical public, F.H. Bradley is recognized primarily for the theories he advanced in Appearance and Reality, which themselves are known, on the whole, only through the writings of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. It has been suggested that the rejection of idealism during the early twentieth century, and the subsequent rise to prominence of analysis, was for Moore and Russell in many respects a rejection of the central ideas in Appearance and Reality. History, we are told, is always written by a conflict’s victors, and surely to this philosophy is no exception. Bradley’s notable fall from prominence, however, has deposited him in the philosophical netherworld, and his metaphysical arguments, when mentioned, are often invoked to show students how they by all means must not conduct their own. That Bradley was an idealist, a monist, an absolutist, and even a mystic are all things everyone seems to know, but I suspect that upon the careful inspection of Bradley’s project, these labels can be shown to supply only misleading half truths, and in some cases, might not stick at all. But let me make clear that in this paper, my concern will not be with what has been said about Bradley. Rather, this is a paper about what Bradley says.