Synthetic biology: supporting an anti-reductionist view of life

Synthese 205 (2):1-26 (2025)
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Abstract

The life sciences have evoked long-standing philosophical debates on a system view of life versus a reductionist view that reduces the complexity of life-forms to parts-based entities that can be described purely mechanistically. This paper examines how current scientific advances in the life sciences can contribute to an anti-reductionist concept of life. It does so by looking at synthetic biology, a discipline within the life sciences that has an ambiguous relationship to this debate. While the field’s engineering approach to life could be considered a manifestation of a reductionist view of life, it also builds on a more holistic, systems view of life. This paper analyses recent scientific practices taking place within synthetic biology that seem to challenge the reductionist view of life. After analyzing the main anti-reductionist philosophical accounts of life, I ask how synthetic biology practices can support these accounts of life by considering living systems as processual, collaborative, and cognitive, and life versus nonlife on a more gradual scale. This empirically informed paper contributes to the literature by drawing observations about the concept of life by connecting the following: the reductionist view in the life sciences, the different anti-reductionist metaphysical stances in the philosophy of biology, and the emerging practices in synthetic biology. The paper concludes that synthetic biology can support anti-reductionist views of life in the philosophy of biology.

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