Plato, Ecstasy and Identity
Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany (
1997)
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Abstract
The primary concern of Plato, Ecstasy and Identity is how various ecstatic experiences initially came to be deprecated in the West, taking as its point of departure that crucial period of time in ancient Greek civilization from the Homeric to the classical period, especially the dialogues of Plato. Part One centers around what I call the stasis/ekstasis connection, establishing first the general problem of ecstasy as it existed for Plato and then moving to the more specific problem of the pharmakon. Plato saw psychological disorder, such as that found in religious cults featuring ecstasy, as being casually related to increasing levels of stasis or political disorder. Part Two expands upon the subjects introduced in Part One to include philosophy's hostile encounter with epic poetry, its recitation by the rhapsode, comedy and tragedy. Each of these traditional vehicles of moral pedagogy and/or entertainment is criticized for their disruptive effect upon identity. ;In Part Three I argue that in order to remove ecstasy from the polis Plato fashions a moral economy, one that revolves m many significant respects around the process of regimen. Regimen, diaita, may be seen as having three different dimensions within the Platonic text: somatic, noetic and discursive. In the course of this discussion I examine ancient medicine, magic and rhetoric. Part Four begins with a detailed examination of the Greek institution that epitomized the problem of ecstasy as it involved the pharmakon: the drinking symposium. The ethics of the symposion were part of a private, controlled, collective exploration of ecstasy, one that often broke down and spilled out into the public realm, with dire political consequences. Socrates is a model of sobriety that is physiologically impossible, and the set of legislative proposals that Plato lays out in the Laws for reforming the symposion denies the ecstasy arising out of intoxication to virtually everyone. Part Four concludes with an argument that rulers are entitled to the "well-born" lie of the Republic, whose deceptive powers are distinctly referred to as being a pharmakon in the ancient sense, simultaneously therapeutic, religious, and mind-altering