What Counts as a Number?

International Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):229-249 (2013)
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Abstract

Georg Cantor argued that pure mathematics would be better-designated “free mathematics” since mathematical inquiry need not justify its discoveries through some extra-mental standard. Even so, he spent much of his later life addressing ancient and scholastic objections to his own transfinite number theory. Some philosophers have argued that Cantor need not have bothered. Thomas Aquinas at least, and perhaps Aristotle, would have consistently embraced developments in number theory, including the transfinite numbers. The author of this paper asks whether the restriction of arithmetic to the natural numbers that is apparently assumed by Aristotle and Aquinas is necessary in the light of their stated principles. The author concludes that, while some texts from Aristotle and Thomas suggest that such discoveries as zero, rational, and real numbers, and even Cantor’s own transfinite numbers, are legitimate objects of scientific knowledge, a careful analysis shows that they are incompatible with the ultimate arithmetical principle, the unit

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