Abstract

Sympathetic interpretations of Kant’s frequently stressed characterizations of his "architectonic" approach to philosophy are rare. As much as such an approach seemed to gratify Kant, it has embarrassed commentators, who have complained for generations about the "Procrustean bed" or ad hoc quality of Kant’s meta-philosophical principles. The author of this book proposes to take quite seriously the idea of a "unity in Kant’s thinking," but his approach to such an issue is historical and, for the most part, unsystematic. That is, rather than discuss the philosophical importance of a claim for architectonic unity, he instead announces that he will demonstrate that the "unity" of Kant’s entire corpus is the "unity of a problem-determined development in his thinking, not that of a pre-conceived or static system." The result of this approach is a well-informed, but only incidentally thematic summary of Kant’s occasionally continuous, occasionally radically altered views of various Hauptprobleme.