Abstract

After a skillful interweaving of the ideas of past philosophers, which have been rapidly, but for the most part fairly, run through under his critical glance, Walsh concludes that Metaphysics as the explication of the first principles of discourse is not only possible, but unavoidable if one is to be a serious philosopher. But having accepted this much of the Aristotelian notion of Metaphysics-as-analysis, Walsh registers a modernized Kantian caveat in which he rejects the Ontological pretensions that some metaphysicians have entertained: e.g., Aristotle's conception of Metaphysics as being also the science of separate substance. Consistent with this rejection is a rejection of a meaningful isomorphism between the first principles of discourse and the first principles of being. Thus, the former are in no way absolute, but must be seen in the context of the cultural and linguistic community in which they occur. In taking up the question of the justification of a set of metaphysical principles, Walsh avoids the fashionable but impossibly vague umbrella-term, "pragmatic justification," which he recognizes is a relic from the brasher days of Verificationism; but he still concludes that metaphysical statements can be neither true nor false, but, at best, consistent. There is much to take issue with in this book, but its clear style and frank but judicious appraisals of the opinions of other philosophers make it both a stimulating and informative introduction to the subject.—E. A. R.