Abstract

It is generally agreed that Aristotle’s aim in De Interpretatione 9 is to rebut arguments purporting to show that bivalence entails fatalism. But the nature of his rebuttal is controversial. Some have argued that Aris- totle accepts the arguments as valid and responds by limiting biva- lence; others have argued that he accepts unlimited bivalence and responds by showing the arguments to be invalid. This paper develops and defends a novel version of the latter view, one which diverges from extant varieties in four main ways. First, it shows that there is good reason to view the chapter’s opening sentences as revealing a commitment to unlimited bivalence. Second, it argues that Aristotle rejects the fatalist arguments on the grounds that they equivocate bet- ween two distinct senses of necessity – absolute and hypothetical. Third, it explains the distinction between the two senses of necessity as deriving from their different explanatory bases. Fourth, it describes the distinct ways in which the two forms of necessity apply to states of affairs and assertions. The paper concludes by discussing the fatalist arguments and how Aristotle’s criticism applies to them.