Semantic Direct Realism

American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (1):51-64 (2020)
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Abstract

The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.

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Howard Robinson
Central European University

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References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.
The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Perception and its objects.Bill Brewer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.

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