Abstract

In this thesis I defend a realist theory of causality. At the core of the thesis is a distinction between two components of causality, the connection component and the modal component. The connection component is the "mechanism" that links causes with their effects. I argue that at the most basic level , causes and effects are connected by the transference, the literal persistence, of something from cause to effect . The modal component is the "force" of causal relations: it's in virtue of this that causes necessitate, or at least raise the probabilities of, their effects. I discuss several problems confronting a realist understanding of causal necessity. My main focus here is on the slippery notion of a counterfactual and how it can be used to ground realist causal powers. Such causal powers depend crucially on laws, and I argue next --against recent "singularist" views--that all causal relations must be subsumed by laws. Finally, I take up the problem of mental causation . I offer a realist account of such causation by appealing to tropes . By recognizing mental tropes, we can, I argue, solve many of the problems of mental causation that have recently occupied philosophers of mind