Abstract

The present study of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo is composed of two parts. The longer first part is a chapter by chapter interpretative explication of the text of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, while the second part further develops certain key themes of this interpretation. Feeling, which plays a central role in the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo's account of objective experience, is the special focus of this study. There are various types of feeling incorporated into the deductions of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, the most important of which for the purposes of this project is a feeling of self, which is here interpreted as a feeling of spontaneity or an immediate consciousness of doing . In attempting to explain how our representations come for us to possess reality or to refer to "actual things," Fichte also makes use of feelings of striving, limitation, intellectual compulsion, and a feeling of "ought," as well as other types of feeling. Fichte's use of a feeling of "ought" in his account of theoretical consciousness reflects his interest in the interdependency of the theoretical and the practical, which is a hallmark of his particular style of transcendental philosophy, focused as it is upon the freely acting I. ;Fichte's transcendental account of experience is also a genetic account of consciousness, which is here interpreted as an explanation of the origin of reflective consciousness. Another significant element of the present study is a reconstructed theory of Body as the essence of the actually willing subject for whom alone represented objects can possess reality. Finally, there is a focus in this study upon transcendental philosophy as such, including an investigation into the relations between the transcendental philosopher, the transcendental subject, and the empirical subject, as well as an examination of the distinctive method of transcendental philosophy. As a result of the latter, a theory of the double method of Fichte's transcendental philosophy is proposed as a synthesis of reason and observation. There are also occasional comparisons of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason