Abstract

In this article I examine the notion of human dignity as it appears to ground fundamental human rights, both in the Universal Declaration of 1948 and in the Swiss Federal Constitution. I claim that it is hard to find good arguments in favour of the idea that human dignity should be understood as the intrinsic value of human beings qua human beings. Dignity in this sense is traditionally identified as something a human being cannot lose. I argue that this criterion should be put aside and that we should rather talk of active and passive attributions of dignity. I claim that the latter type of attribution appeals to the idea of standards of life which each specific type of creature should fulfil in order for its life to be considered as a dignified life for that type of creature. Next, I argue that the notion of well-being grounds the normativity of passive attributions of dignity and address a few objections against this view. Finally, I show how this view accommodates the idea expressed in the Swiss Federal Constitution, that creatures other than human beings can have dignity