Abstract

Traditional theories of knowledge explain knowledge in terms of things like justification and belief. Knowledge-first theories of justification and belief explain justification and belief in terms of knowledge. When epistemologists ask whether knowledge "comes first," they are asking whether traditional theories of knowledge take the right approach, or whether knowledge-first theories of things like justification and belief take the right approach. In her contribution to this debate, Mona Simion defends knowledge-first epistemology by defending a knowledge-first theory of belief and using this theory of belief to motivate a knowledge-first theory of justification. In his contribution to this debate, Aidan McGlynn defends traditional epistemology by critiquing Simion's knowledge-first theory of belief. As Simion and McGlynn both recognize, Simion's argument depends on the idea that beliefs that do not amount to knowledge are epistemically defective. While Simion thinks this is plausible, McGlynn thinks we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge. As McGlynn acknowledges, his contribution to the debate does not provide a traditional theory of knowledge in place of Simion's knowledge-first theories of justification and belief. However, if McGlynn is right that we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge, this casts doubt on at least one central idea in knowledge-first epistemology: that knowledge has explanatory priority over belief.