Reason explanation and the second-person perspective

Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):346-357 (2014)
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Abstract

On a widely held view, the canonical way to make sense of intentional actions is to invoke the agent's ‘motivating reasons’, where the claim that X did A for some ‘motivating reason’ is taken to be neutral on whether X had a normative reason to do A. In this paper, I explore a challenge to this view, drawing on Anscombe's ‘second-personal’ approach to the nature of action explanation.

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10.1080/13869795.2014.946954

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Johannes Roessler
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason.J. J. Cunningham - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):235-257.
The matter of motivating reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1563-1589.
Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons.Joseph Cunningham - 2017 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):673-692.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

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