Abstract

We commonly take ourselves to have good reasons for promoting the interests and well-being of our loved ones. There is disagreement, however, about the nature of those reasons. What exactly provides us with reasons for acts of love and how do these reasons relate to other reasons for beneficial acts such as moral reasons? I address these questions here by considering Harry Frankfurt’s and David Velleman’s respective accounts of love, with a particular focus on their responses to Bernard Williams’s hypothetical case of the drowning wife. While Frankfurt argues for a non-moral account of love, Velleman insists that love is a moral emotion. Furthermore, while Frankfurt argues that the husband’s reason for saving his wife over a stranger is given by his love for her, Velleman argues that the husband’s reason for preference has nothing essentially to do with love but is rather provided by their relationship. I argue that both accounts neglect the intimate relation between love and special relationships. Our reasons for benevolent acts on behalf of loved ones are provided by the same things we essentially value in love, the inherent moral value of our beloveds and the special relationships we have with them.