Abstract

The Socrates of Plato's Apology is typically depicted as a brilliant ironist whose behavior at his trial contributed to his conviction and sentence. Beginning with Xenophon, commentators have often characterized Socrates' speeches as adopting a prideful tone that was bound to offend even reasonable people. Some suggest that Socrates' arrogant conduct is exemplified by his own proposed sentence of meals in the Prytaneum. C. D. C. Reeve disputes this rather traditional reading of Plato's Socrates in his sensible and cogent book. On his view, Socrates is fundamentally non-ironic when he claims not to have knowledge or to teach. Furthermore, Socrates mounts a plausible defense against his accusers, which can be understood only in terms of his substantive philosophical positions. Thus, Reeve has much to say about such topics as the nature of the elenchos, Socratic irony, the profession of ignorance and whether Socrates is a teacher, moral virtue and happiness, Socratic religion, and Socratic politics. Here I shall focus on the following parts of Reeve's discussion: the charges against Socrates and the religious basis of his mission, the nature of "human wisdom" and expert knowledge, and questions about Socratic eudaimonism.