Degrees of Preference and Degrees of Preference Satisfaction

Utilitas 23 (3):316-323 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The standard view holds that the degree to which an individual's preferences are satisfied is simply the degree to which the individual prefers the prospect that is realized to the other prospects in her preference domain. In this article, I reject the standard view by showing that it violates one fundamental intuition about degrees of preference satisfaction.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1017/s0953820811000161

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,270

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Utility theory with inexact preferences and degrees of preference.Peter C. Fishburn - 1970 - Synthese 21 (2):204 - 221.
Symposium on Amartya Sen’s philosophy: 2 Unstrapping the straitjacket of ‘preference’: a comment on Amartya Sen’s contributions to philosophy and economics.Elizabeth Anderson - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):21-38.
Preference, Deliberation and Satisfaction.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:131-154.
The Metric of Opportunity.Robert Sudgen - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):307.
Existence Value, Preference Satisfaction, and the Ethics of Species Extinction.Espen Dyrnes Stabell - 2019 - Environmental Ethics 41 (2):165-180.
Value and Preference Relations: Are They Symmetric?Mauro Rossi - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (3):239-253.
Subjectivism and Degrees of Well-Being.Jacob Barrett - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (1):97-104.
Preference Change and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare.Alex Voorhoeve - 2006 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Preferences and Well-Being. Cambridge University Press. pp. 265-79.
Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐being.Hilary Greaves & Harvey Lederman - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):636-667.
Anti-preferences.Roy Kreitner - 2021 - Theoretical Inquiries in Law 22 (2):299-328.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-08-18

Downloads
150 (#152,250)

6 months
9 (#500,261)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mauro Rossi
Université du Québec à Montréal

Citations of this work

Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):767-788.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Moral thinking: its levels, method, and point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance.James Griffin - 1986 - Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press.
Philosophical papers.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by D. H. Mellor.

View all 8 references / Add more references