Four Versions of Liberalism

Dissertation, Stanford University (1988)
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Abstract

Liberalism is often regarded as a mere compromise position between the far left and the far right. It may be possible, however, to distinguish it clearly from other political positions and at the same time to defend it by identifying some characteristic unifying liberal principle. Ronald Dworkin and others have proposed that liberalism rests on the principle that government must be neutral with respect to the various conceptions of the good life held by citizens. Complete neutrality, however, is unworkable and, according to critic Joseph Raz, undesirable. Consideration of the shortcomings of neutrality leads to two different solutions: the rejection of neutrality as a principle of liberalism, or the construction of a constrained neutrality which acknowledges neutrality's limits but attempts to preserve its basic goal. Raz's political philosophy exemplifies the former view, John Rawls' the latter. ;According to Raz, personal autonomy is the central concern of liberalism; government neutrality is inappropriate as a liberal position because it denies or ignores this. Rawls' approach is to find ways to constrain government neutrality towards citizens' conceptions of the good in as neutral a way as possible. He posits a consensus in society around very general ideas, arguing that the constraints are neutral with respect to conceptions of the good because they are derived from those agreed-upon ideas, and therefore are legitimate limits on neutrality. ;The difficulty is that no consensus exists in society which is strong enough to play the role needed by Rawls' theory; the consensus can be either strong enough to motivate action or broad enough to assure neutrality, not both. Even if there were such a consensus it would not solve the problem of justification, since general agreement gives no assurance of correctness. A better solution to the problem of constraining neutrality will look not only to consensus but to what can be said in the way of moral argument in defense of the ideals around which there is a consensus. The consensus can serve as a stepping-stone to a satisfactory liberal system but cannot in itself be relied upon to justify any theory.

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