General Logic and the Method of Metaphysical Deductions

Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 4 (3):245-254 (2023)
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Abstract

This article focuses on the interpretation of the metaphysical deductions of the higher cognitive faculties in Gabriele Gava’s Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics. The aim is to assess the role that Kant’s general logic plays in these metaphysical deductions, the consequences for the analysis of the faculties, and the place of general logic in Gava’s overall theoretical analysis of Kant’s first Critique.

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