Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis Again

Logos and Episteme 7 (1):95-100 (2016)
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Abstract

I reinforce my defense of permissivism about the rationality of doxastic attitudes on the face of a certain body of evidence against criticism published in this journal by Anantharaman. After making some conceptual clarifications, I manage to show that at least one of my original arguments pro-permissivism is left unscathed by Anantharaman's points.

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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews

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