Kern, the Two-Capacity View, and Paradigmatic Exercises of Rationality

In Ori Beck & Miloš Vuletić (eds.), Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience. Springer. pp. 135-138 (2024)
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Abstract

This is a short response piece to “The Knowledge View of Perception. Capacities, Opportunities and Hindrances for Perceptual Knowledge” - a paper given by Andrea Kern at the PEER conference 2021 in Pittsburgh. In it, I criticize Kern's argument against what she calls the Two-Capacity View (TCV). TCV is the view that generally, perception is a capacity that enables subjects to gain perceptual knowledge and that this capacity involves two sub-capacities: one for perception and one for judgment. In this piece, I provide reasons to doubt the second step of her three-step argument, show a way in which defenders of TCV can resist its third step, along with Kern's notion of what we should take paradigmatic exercises of reason to be.

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T. Raja Rosenhagen
California State University, Fresno

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