‘That’-Clauses and Non-nominal Quantification

Philosophical Studies 137 (3):301 - 333 (2008)
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Abstract

This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions). In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism. The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses are singular terms, namely that this claim is needed in order to account for the possibility of quantification into ‘that’-clause position. It is shown that not all quantification in natural languages is quantification into the position of singular terms, but that there is also so-called ‘non-nominal quantification’. A formal analysis of non-nominal quantification is given, and it is argued that quantification into ‘that’-clause position can be treated as another kind non-nominal quantification.

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2009-01-28

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Tobias Rosefeldt
Humboldt University, Berlin

Citations of this work

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The Case Against Higher-Order Metaphysics.Thomas Hofweber - forthcoming - Metaphysics 5 (1):29-50.

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References found in this work

The things we mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Conceptions of truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Objects of thought.Arthur Norman Prior - 1971 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by P. T. Geach & Anthony Kenny.
Syntax and semantics of questions.Lauri Karttunen - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (1):3--44.
Everything.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.

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