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The refutation of nominalism (?)
Philosophical Topics 21 (2):141--86 (1993)
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Citations of this work
Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Neo-fregeanism and quantifier variance.Theodore Sider - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):201–232.
Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo‐Logicism.Fraser MacBride - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):103-163.
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