The Subjective and Corporeal Perception of the Cinematographic Frame According to Kantian Viewpoint

Kimiahonar 7 (28):45-56 (2018)
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Abstract

The cinematographic frame is a boundary which separates the image from the external world. From an ontological viewpoint which dates back to Greek philosophy, the boundary of a thing separates it from other things, thus leading to its ontological independence from other things. But, according to this point of view, the being of things as external objects is considered to be free from the impact of subjective interference and the experience of the viewer. This idea was radically changed with Kant’s Copernican revolution. By separating the Thing in Itself from the Phenomena, Kant, on the one hand, announced that the object of human cognition is only the Phenomena, and on the other hand, that they are knowable only to the extent that they are known under the a priori subjective factors, i.e. the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding. The first purpose of this paper is to show the limitations of the traditional concepts of the cinematographic frame according to the subjective perception of the viewer. The second objective is to ask how it is possible not to regard this perception as just a mental perception, but a corporeal one. Finally, the results of this investigation are considered in the analysis of the corporeal perception of the cinematographic frame.

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Milad Roshani Payan
Shahid Beheshti University

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