Abstract

In this dissertation, I conduct a historical and systematic study in the theory of rationality. I first outline the classical Western epistemological model of reason as disinterested contemplation of fundamental realities--the Greek model of theoria, which I call the "metaphysical" interpretation of reason . I then locate the contemporary problem--the crisis in Western rationality resulting from the critique and partial breakdown of the traditional model of theoria, and the possibility of nihilism or extreme conceptual relativism--in Nietzsche's epistemology . Following the articulation of the problem, I examine the responses to this problem offered by perhaps the most prominent representatives of two of the main contemporary philosophical traditions. I analyze and criticize empiricist and pragmatist approaches in the work of Quine, with particular attention to his theories of evidence and observation, his demarcation of science and ethics, and his meta-theory of science . Finally, I present Habermas' response both to the critique of classical epistemology and to the empiricist and positivist re-interpretation of reason as "science." This is articulated as a "critical social theory," and particularly as a theory of "communicative rationality." I outline Habermas' "universalist" claims for the structures of communicative rationality, and complete by treatment of Habermas' work by criticizing these universalist claims. I do this largely through recourse to hermeneutical and cross-cultural epistemological considerations. I conclude by suggesting possible more "inclusive" epistemological frameworks, able to meet Nietzsche's "problem" and thus go beyond nihilism or extreme relativism, as well as beyond some of the limits of Quine's and Habermas' epistemologies