The Essential and the Epochal Aspects of Philosophy

Review of Metaphysics 23 (4):699 - 716 (1970)
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Abstract

Hegel rejected this view. The laws of phenomena constitute a general copy of the phenomena themselves. This copy lacks the internal relation of the phenomena's schema and, being their Abbild, it follows the phenomena. For Hegel the subject-matter of philosophy is the whole, and he could not, therefore, confine the character of philosophy to the exploration of legislation which applies to data or which is only a form replacing empirical data. Being a cognition of fullness, philosophy is also the self-reflection of the Idea which in turn is identical with being. Here Hegel follows in the footsteps of Aristotle. Once he elaborates the subject-matter of philosophy, Hegel also elaborates what we may call the philosophy of philosophy, that is, the delineation of philosophical thinking as against any other activity of the mind including science, art, religion. Hegel's substantive notions of philosophy are imbued with his conceptions of the nature of philosophy, and these two aspects of his system are closely interrelated.

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