How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs

Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742 (2016)
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Abstract

People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.

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10.1080/09515089.2016.1146667

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Darrell P. Rowbottom
Lingnan University

Citations of this work

Belief in character studies.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):27-42.
Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief.Chi Yin Chan & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1204-1220.
Why ‘believes’ is not a vague predicate.Sophie Archer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3029-3048.
How Beliefs are like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
The distinction problem of self-deception.Chi Yin Chan - 2020 - Dissertation, Lingnan University

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle, Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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