The first-person perspective: A test for naturalism

American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348 (1998)
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Abstract

Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by functionalist models. For example, recently Ned Block commented

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edition Baker, Lynne Rudder (2018) "The First-Person Perspective". Philosophia Christi 20(1):61-66

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Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Personal Identity.David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris, The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
Naturalism and the first-person perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - In Georg Gasser, How Successful is Naturalism? Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 203-226.
Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content.Kristina Musholt - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672.

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