What is this thing called 'commonsense psychology'?

Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What is this thing called ‘Commonsense Psychology’? The first matter to settle is what the issue is here. By ‘commonsense psychology,’ I mean primarily the systems of describing, explaining and predicting human thought and action in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, expectations, intentions and other so-called propositional attitudes. Although commonsense psychology encompasses more than propositional attitudes--e.g., emotions, traits and abilities are also within its purview--belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology is what we use to explain intentional action as ordinarily described--e.g., Jack went to the store because he wanted some ice cream. Commonsense psychology also is used to explain mental states--e.g., Jill feared that she would be late because she thought that the meeting began at 4:00. Commonsense psychology is the province of everyone; we all use it all the time

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,401

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Commonsense Psychology.Shaun Nichols - 1992 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
The computational account of belief.Lawrence J. Kaye - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (2):137-53.
Reply to Jackson, II.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):196-198.
III—The Epistemic Role of Intentions.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):41-56.
Intentionality and moral judgments in commonsense thought about action.Steven Sverdlik - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):224-236.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
212 (#123,142)

6 months
14 (#181,413)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

The limits of spectatorial folk psychology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.
"Folk psychology" is not folk psychology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
Mental causation and the paradoxes of explanation.Karsten R. Stueber - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.
Psychological explanation and implicit theory.Frank Jackson - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95.
Davidson, Reasons, and Causes: A Plea for a Little Bit More Empathy.Karsten R. Stueber - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (2):59-75.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland (ed.) - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

View all 17 references / Add more references