In Defense of Moral Evidentialism

Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

ISBN(s)

20690533

DOI

10.5840/logos-episteme20156433

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506.
Doxastic Wronging and Evidentialism.Sophia Dandelet - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):82-95.
The Ethics of Belief (3rd edition).Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup, The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
The duty to believe according to the evidence.Allen Wood - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1-3):7-24.
Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-contravening Commitments.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):73-82.
Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin, Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.
Introduction [to Logos & Episteme, Special Issue: The Ethics of Belief].Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):397-404.
Is There Room for Justified Beliefs without Evidence? A Critical Assessment of Epistemic Evidentialism.Domingos Faria - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):137-152.
Quasi-Evidentialism: Interests, Justification and Epistemic Virtue.Karyn L. Freedman - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):147-160.
Evidence Through a Glass, Darkly.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):56-61.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-08

Downloads
1,216 (#16,078)

6 months
129 (#42,541)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sharon Ryan
West Virginia University

Citations of this work

Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.
Salvaging Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Jackson & Andrew Rogers - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (1):59-84.
Doxastic Voluntarism.Mark Boespflug & Elizabeth Jackson - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Case for Epistemic Agency.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):449-474.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Ethics of Belief.W. K. Clifford - 1999 - In William Kingdon Clifford, The ethics of belief and other essays. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. pp. 70-97.
Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.

View all 11 references / Add more references