Normative systems and medical metaethics part II: Health-maximizing and persons

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (3):343-359 (1981)
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Abstract

Two common medical-ethical axions, the health-maximizing axiom and the personhood-respecting axiom, are discussed. On the basis of a philosophical analysis of personhood and freedom of the will it is shown that these two axioms are incompatible. The rejection of the first axiom is suggested.

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reprint Sadegh-Zadeh, Kazem (1981) "Normative systems and medical metaethics Part II: Health-maximizing and persons". Metamedicine 2(3):343-359

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Author's Profile

Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh
Westfälische Wilhelms-Uiversität Münster

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Preference among preferences.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):377-391.

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