How to Resist Bramble's Arguments against Temporal Well-being?

Res Philosophica 98 (1):141-148 (2021)
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Tatjana Visak
Universität Mannheim

Citations of this work

The usefulness of well-being temporalism.Gil Hersch - 2022 - Journal of Economic Methodology 30 (4):322-336.

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References found in this work

Consequentialism about Meaning in Life.Ben Bramble - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (4):445-459.
The Passing of Temporal Well-Being.Ben Bramble - 2017 - New York, NY: Routledge.

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