Grasp of concepts: common sense and expertise in an inferentialist framework

In P. Piccari M. Bianca (ed.), Epistemology of Ordinary Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 289-297 (2015)
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Abstract

The paper suggests a distinction between two dimensions of grasp of concepts within an inferentialist approach to conceptual content: a common sense "minimum" version, where a simple speaker needs just a few inferences to grasp a concept C, and an expert version, where the specialist is able to master a wide range of inferential transitions involving C. This paper tries to defend this distinction and to explore some of its basic implications.

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Pietro Salis
Universita di Cagliari

Citations of this work

Not quite neo-sentimentalism.Tristram Oliver-Skuse - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):877-899.

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Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. Edited by Ernest LePore.
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Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Blind reasoning.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.

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