Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):85-110 (1997)
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10.1080/00455091.1997.10715963

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Nathan Salmón
University of California, Santa Barbara

Citations of this work

Is Genuine Satisficing Rational?Edmund Henden - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):339-352.
À Propos de Pierre, Does He…or Doesn’t He?Nathan Salmon - 2023 - In Ernest Lepore & David Sosa (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language, 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 176-181.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Meaning and reference.Hilary Putnam - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):699-711.
Illogical Belief.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.
Opacity.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Barbara Humphries (ed.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. Duke University Press. pp. 229-289.

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