Abstract

Peirce’s pragmatist theory of truth holds that truth will be the outcome of an indefinitely adequate amount of scientific research. According to the _minima trivialia_ objection, Peirce’s theory of truth is refuted by such common sense truths as that about what I ate for breakfast, which is hardly the outcome of a prolonged collective scientific endeavour. The argument does not work, however, if we endorse Sellars’s distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image of mankind in the world and the connected scientific realism: in this Sellarsian context, _minima trivialia_ can be seen as false views from the perspective of the manifest image, like the existence and persistence of material objects, and not as proper truths, which are appreciated as such only from the point of view of the scientific image. Therefore, the endorsement of this distinction, which is quite compatible with Peirce’s framework, bypasses the _minima trivialia_ objection.