Partiality and Retrospective Justification

Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 (1):8-26 (2017)
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Abstract

Sometimes changes in an agent's partial values can cast a positive light on an earlier action, which was wrong when it was performed. Based on independent reflections about the role of partiality in determining when blame is appropriate, I argue that in such cases the agent shouldn't feel remorse about her action and that others can't legitimately blame her for it, even though that action was wrong. The action thus receives a certain kind of retrospective justification.

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Bernhard Salow
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

One-by-one: moral theory for separate persons.Bastian Steuwer - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
Making Peace with Moral Imperfection.Camil Golub - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (2).

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