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Philosophical Studies 141 (2):263 - 280 (2008)
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Abstract

Jeffrey King's principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails

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Nathan Salmón
University of California, Santa Barbara

Citations of this work

Demonstratives without rigidity or ambiguity.Ethan Nowak - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (5):409-436.
Demonstratives in philosophy and linguistics.Lynsey Wolter - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):451-468.
Salmon on Hob and Nob.David Friedell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):213-220.

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References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.
Intentional identity.P. T. Geach - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):627-632.

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