The truth about neptune and the seamlessness of truth

Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):87 - 93 (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This comment on Steven Boer's “Object-Dependent Thoughts” develops two examples: (1) a counterexample to the "axiom of the seamlessness of truth," namely, that there are no propositions, one true and one false, such that knowing the true one requires believing the false one; (2) a story about the first sighting of Neptune, by John Galle on September 23, 1846, that illustrates how one can understand Galle's remark "That is the planet whose position Leverrier calculated" without believing that there is something to which Galle refers.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,010

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive?Gregor Damschen - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):161-169.
The truth about "it is true that…".Varol Akman & M. Burak Senol - 2016 - Pragmatics and Cognition 23 (2):284-299.
“True” as Ambiguous.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.
How to believe the impossible.Curtis Brown - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 58 (3):271-285.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
58 (#369,860)

6 months
10 (#410,099)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Sanford
Duke University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references