Inferência da Melhor Explicação, Virtudes Explicativas e Critérios para a Escolha de Teorias

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 28 (4):639–657 (2024)
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Abstract

In the debate about the Inference to the Best Explanation, Peter Lipton and Gilbert Harman argue that there are some explanatory virtues or criteria that guide the inferential processes of generation or selection of scientific hypotheses. However, although Lipton lists some of these virtues very briefly in his work, there is no apparent consensus and organization in the philosophy of science literature about what all these criteria are and how they actually operate. The objective of this present article is to offer a taxonomy of these virtues or criteria based on an accurate bibliographic research, proposing an ordering and explanation of each one of them, as well as pointing out a philosophical problem arising from the liptonian approach to IBE.

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Gabriel Chiarotti Sardi
University of São Paulo

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References found in this work

Science without laws.Ronald N. Giere - 1999 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
A novel defense of scientific realism.Jarrett Leplin - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.Imre Lakatos - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-196.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.
Values in Science.Ernan McMullin - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982 (4):3-28.

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