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Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation
Lanham: Lexington Books (2022)
Abstract
This book argues that Hume is a radical epistemic skeptic who gives only practical reasons for retaining belief in sensory beliefs and the deliverances of reason. He advises us to take a moderate approach to the demands of philosophy, since they sometimes diverge from the demands of life.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The Role of Philosophy in Hume’s Critique of Empire.Elena Yi-Jia Zeng - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (2):136-157.
References found in this work
Hume on Distinctions of Reason: A Resemblance-First Interpretation.Taro Okamura - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):423-436.
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