Ontology, Reference, and the Qua Problem: Amie Thomasson on Existence

Axiomathes 23 (3):543-550 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that Amie Thomasson’s recent theory of the methodology to be applied to find the truth-conditions for claims of existence faces serious objections. Her account is based on Devitt and Sterelny’s solution to the qua problem for theories of reference fixing; however, such a solution cannot be also applied to analyze existential claims

Other Versions

reprint Sauchelli, Andrea (2013) "Ontology, Reference, and the Qua Problem: Amie Thomasson on Existence". Global Philosophy 23(3):543-550

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,369

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-09-15

Downloads
230 (#113,472)

6 months
21 (#142,675)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrea Sauchelli
Lingnan University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Ordinary Objects.Amie L. Thomasson (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Designation.Michael Devitt - 1981 - New York: Columbia University Press.

View all 21 references / Add more references