Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism Part II: A Further Reply to Aikin and Dabay

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2015)
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Abstract

This reply sets out an argument that demonstrates that a contrastive theory of self-knowledge is inconsistent with internalism in the philosophy of mind. It follows from my paper 'Contrastive Self-Knowledge', Social Epistemology, 2014, 28: 139-152.

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Sarah Sawyer
University of Sussex

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Contrastive Self-knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):139-152.

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